Jean Eid
ResearchWorking PapersPublicationsArticles
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ABSTRACT: This
paper examines the relationship between how hospital owner ship is
organized and the intensity of competition in the health care
market. I study the question using an empirical entry model.
These models typically exhibit multiple equilibria. To resolve
this problem, a novel algorithm that computes all the equilibria
of the game is developed. This paper uses the algorithm together
with two different equilibrium selection rules to estimate the
parameters of interest. My findings suggest that for-profit and
not-for-profit hospitals are differentiated. I use my estimates
to simulate two counterfactuals. First, I study a market were only
not-for-profit hospitals exists. The results suggest a decrease in
the level of health services. Second, I study a market were
not-for-profit firms do not enjoy any tax shelters. I again find a
decrease in the level of health services. I conclude that mixed
markets are beneficial to consumers.
The most recent working paper version is available for download as a PDF file (272 Kb.) ABSTRACT:
Our paper investigates the variation of winning bids in slave
auctions held in New Orleans from 1804 to 1862. Specifically, we
measure the variation in the price of slaves conditional on their
geographical origin. Previous work using a regression framework
ignored the auction mechanism used to sell slaves. This introduced
a bias in the conditional mean of the winning bid since it
depended on the number of bidders participating in the auction.
Unfortunately, the number of bidders is unobserved by the
econometrician. We adopt the standard framework of a symmetric
independent private value auction and propose an estimation
strategy to attempt to deal with this omitted variable bias. Our
estimate of the mean number of bidders doubled from 1804 to 1862.
We find the number of bidders had a significant positive effect on
the average winning bid. An increase from 20 to 30 bidders in an
auction raised the average winning bid by around 10 percent. The
price variation according to the geographical origin of slaves
found in earlier work continues to persist after accounting for
the omitted variable. We also find a new result that a
considerable premium is paid for slaves originating from New
Orleans. However, this price variation disappears once we account
for regional productivity differences.
The most recent working paper version is available for download as a PDF file (443 Kb.)
The most
recent working paper version is available for download
as a PDF file (302 Kb.)
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